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RECENT CASES
COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL: The Commonwealth's Attorney as counsel for the defense
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia was recently confronted with the question of the propriety of
appointing a Commonwealth's Attorney from one county
to defend a person charged with a crime in another
county. After advocating what it felt was the best answer
to this question, the Court unblushingly reached an opposite holding. In Yates v. Peyton,1 the Circuit Court of
Cumberland County appointed the Commonwealth's Attorney of Powhatan County to represent the petitioner,
who had been indicted on three charges of statutory
burglary and one charge of possessing burglary tools.
Sometime after the petitioner was convicted of these four
charges and sentenced to a total of ten years in prison,
the Powhatan Commonwealth's Attorney served a warrant upon the petitioner which charged him with grand
larceny in Powhatan County. It is not clear whether
there was any action pending against the petitioner in
Powhatan County at the time the Commonwealth's Attorney defended him in Cumberland County. It is clear,
however, that after the filing of the indictment in Powhatan County, three terms of court were allowed to pass
without the petitioner being brought to trial, and the case
was automatically dismissed.
With this set of facts before it, the Supreme Court of
Appeals reviewed the petitioner's contention that he was
denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel at the trial. In reaching the conclusion (which
it did not follow) the Court referred to Council Opinion
1. 207 Va. 91, 147 S.E. 2d 767 (i966).

388

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

No. 2 of the Virginia State Bar Opinions of 1965. That
opinion pointed out that the question was not answered
by any provision of the Constitution of Virginia or of the
Code of Virginia or by .any opinion of the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia or of the Attorney General of
Virginia. The committee which investigated the problem
suggested that Commonwealth's Attorneys should under
no circumstances be appointed to act as defense counsel
in criminal cases. But while it flatly condemned the practice, the committee went on to say that it was a matter
for the legislature to remedy. The Supreme Court of
Appeals also condemned the practice, and, in effect, left
the situation unchanged. While affirming the petitioner's
conviction, the Court suggested that the practice of appointing a Commonwealth's Attorney to defend an indigent person charged with a crime is bad and should be
discontinued.
In evaluating the practice, the Supreme Court of Appeals did not really present reasons for its opinion that
the practice should or should not be continued. Several
reasons for ending the practice were discussed in Goodson v. Peyton.' In that case, the Commonwealth's Attorney for Cumberland County was appointed to represent a
defendant in a criminal case in the Circuit Court of Powhatan County. While it affirmed the defendant's conviction, the court gave several reasons for advocating a
blanket prohibition of the practice in the future. First,
the Commonwealth's Attorney is an official of the Commonwealth. The defendant he represents may be injured
by his aversion to attacking laws, interpretations, practices, and conduct which it is his duty to defend and uphold in his own county. Second, there is always the
possibility of a need for a change of venue to the county
wherein the Commonwealth's Attorney holds his office.
2. 351 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir. 1965).
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The third reason discussed by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals is the one which cuts most deeply into the
defendant's constitutional right to adequate counsel, and
yet is a factor which is almost impossible to measure.
This is the possibility that the defendant did not confide
in his attorney because he knew he was a state prosecutor.
The defendant may keep information to himself for fear
of implicating himself in a crime in the county in which
his lawyer is Commonwealth's Attorney, or he may simply not trust a man who normally is on the other side of
the fence.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Goodson gave
three convincing reasons for ending this practice. Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia decided Yates at a later date than Goodson, it passed the
problem on to the legislature. Perhaps it would be best
for this practice to be prohibited by the General Assembly. But unless and until such legislative -action is taken,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia should refuse
to affirm the convictions of defendants who were represented by court-appointed lawyers who are also Commonwealth's Attorneys.
ROBERT L. Giu&rsr

EVIDENCE: Tacit admissions in criminaltrials,
In Baughan v. Commomvealth, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia held that the defendant's failure
to deny an accusation made in his presence was admissible at his criminal trial as a tacit admission of guilt.
Both the incriminating statement and the defendant's
silence are treated as circumstances from which a jury
1. 206 Va. 28, 141 S.E. 2d 750 (1965), 51 VA. L. Rnv. 1417 (1966), 79
A.L.R. 2d 890.
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may infer that he acquiesced in the truth of the accusation. This decision was in line with the rule followed in a
majority of states and supported by leading authorities.'
In holding that tacit admissions are admissible, Baughan
reaffirmed several earlier Virginia decisions.'
The evidence in the case indicates that police officers
apprehended Handy leaving Baughan 's home with a bottle of whiskey. When questioned, Handy claimed that
Baughan had sold the whiskey to him. Thereupon, the
officers obtained a search warrant and returned to
Baughan's home with Handy. After knocking at the door
for approximately fifteen minutes, the officers and Handy
were admitted into the house. Handy accused Baughan
of having sold the whiskey to him and having kept several
other bottles in a cabinet which then stood empty.
Baughan did not protest or deny the accusations. A
search subsequently turned up several bottles of whiskey.
Baughan was then arrested for selling liquor illegally.
In Baughan, the court relied upon the test laid down
in Owens v. Commonwealth' which required (1) that the
accused must have heard the statement and understood
that it incriminated him; (2) that he must have had an
opportunity to deny; and (3) that the statement, under
the circumstances, must have naturally called for a reply.
The court in Owens recognized that tacit admissions must
be received in evidence with caution. The three requirements were, therefore, a means of limiting the use of tacit
admissions in criminal trials.
In spite of these safeguards, several arguments remain
2. Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 56 (1895) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 32 A. 2d 889 (Pa. 1943); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1071 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 247; UNmFoPbi RULES OF
EVIDENCE

63 (8).

3. Tillman v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 46, 37 S.E. 2d 768 (1946); Oweni
v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E. 2d 895 (1947); James v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 713, 66 S.E. 2d 513 (1951).
4. Supra note 3.
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for excluding defendant's failure to deny accusations in
all situations. The three major objections are: (1) that
it violates the hearsay rule,5 (2) that it amounts to a
deprivation of the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination,' and (3) that it is unreliable as proof of
either acquiescence in the truth of an accusation or consciousness of guilt.7
The courts almost universally reject the hearsay argument when the Owens test is met." The statement of the
accuser is not introduced for its truthful content, but
merely as a circumstance which, when considered with
the defendant's failure to deny, allows an inference that
the defendant has admitted the truth of the statement or
has demonstrated a guilty conscience. An innocent man,
it is said, would obviously denly a false charge made in his
presence.'
Most states have also rejected the self-incrimination
argument. Relying upon a literal interpretation of the
language set forth in state constitutions or statutes (before Malloy v. Hoga ° ) or in the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, it is held that the privilege does
not apply to police interrogations, but only to testimonial
compulsion in judicial proceedings." In Owens, the Virginia court expressly rejected the argument that the deprivilege guaranteed by the Virginia Constitufendant's
tion1 2 was violated. " However, the prevailing rule today
in federal courts (with the exception of the courts of the
District of Columbia) is that tacit admissions should be
5. Baughan, supra note 1, at 33.
6. Owens, supra note 3, at 695.
7. Vallone, supra note 2 (dissent).

8. Annot, 79 A.L.R. 2d 890 (1961).
9. People v. Smith, 25 I1. 2d 219, 184 N.E. 2d 841 (1962).
10. 378 U. S. 1 (1963).
11. 8 WiOitORE, EVrDENCa § 2251 (3d ed. 1940).
12. VA. CONST. § 8.
13. Supra note 3, at 700.
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excluded."' In Helton v. United States,'5 the court said
that the protection of the Fifth Amendment does not begin with the trial.
History tells us that it was the preliminary inquisition, prior to trial on the merits, which gave
rise to the abuses, which resulted in the recognition of the privilege -against self-incrimination.
Under our law it is not the function of police officers to determine for the benefit of the jury
whether or not a person under arrest on suspicion of crime has given a sufficient explanation,
or any explanation at all."8
The existence of the privilege also renders defendant's
silence ambivalent at the very least because an assertion
of the privilege or silence is legally consistent with innocence.' Whether the privilege extends to police interrogation or not, the commonly-held belief that one has a
constitutional right to remain silent' 8 would make defendant's silence under the circumstances an unreliable proof
of acquiescence in the truth of the accusation.
The third objection has found favor with more courts
than the preceding two. In a recent New Jersey decision, 9 the doctrine of assenting silence was said to be out
of touch with what the behaviorist sciences have taught
us in recent years. Defendant may be prompted to remain
silent by factors other than a guilty conscience. For
example, he may believe that "silence in the face of police
questioning is the safest course to follow and that it is
Comment, 31 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 556 (1964).
221 F. 2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 350.
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 422 (1957) ; 8 WzGMOaa §
2251; Noonan, Inferences from the Invocation of the Privilege, 41 VA.
L. REv. 311 (1955).
18. 79 Hav. L. Rav. 935 (1966) ; 11 D- PAUL L. Rv.307, 317 (1962).
19. State v. Garcia,83 N. J. Super. 345, 199 A. 2d 860 (1964).

14.
15.
16.
17.
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the wise man who refuses to enter into a debate with his
accusers-regardless of whether he is guilty or innocent." 2" Admittedly, silence may indicate a consciousness
of guilt. "Equally, it may indicate fright, contempt, ignorance, or simply cautious reluctance to do verbal battle
without counsel.I 21
The courts have been anything but consistent where
tacit admissions of one under arrest are concerned. In
Plymale v. Commonwealth,22 the court held that defendant's silence was inadmissible because he had been advised of his right to remain silent. In a California case,23
defendant's silence was held to be inadmissible because
he had not been advised of his right to remain silent.
Since Baughan, however, the rule regarding tacit admissions has been changed by a brief footnote in Miranda
v. Arizona. In footnote 37, the Court said:
In accord with this decision, it is impermissible
to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege when he is under police
custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood
mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
The immediate effect of such a rule is that the defendant's privilege begins to operate during police custodial
interrogation (thereby excluding evidence ofhis failure
to deny accusations during that period) rather than dur20. 79 HAxv. L. Rv. 935 (1966).
21. Comment, 15 SYRAcusn L. REv. 590, 592 (1962) ; cf. Brody, Admissions
Implied from Silence, Evasion and Equivocation in Massachusetts, 42
B. U. L. Rav. 46 (1962); Gaynor, The Admission in Evidence of State-

ments Made in the Presence of the Defendant, 48 J. CUm. L., C.&P. S.

193 (1957).
22. 195 Va. 582, 79 S.E. 2d 610 (1954).
23. People v. Dykes, 52 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966).
24. 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
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ing the period following arrest. "Arrest" and "custody"
are not synonymous. The Miranda Court said that an individual must be advised of his right to remain silent and
to have counsel when he is "first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any way." ' 25 This is
a much broader concept than the notion of arrest in Virginia. In Owens, for example, the defendant was subjected to extensive police questioning during which he
failed to deny an accusation made by his accomplice.
"Not until after [Owens] had remained silent, in the face
'2
of Vaughan's accusation was the accused arrested. 1
Applying the Miranda rule, evidence of Owens' failure
to deny the accusation would not be admissible.
A Pennsylvania case decided in October, 1966, recognized the effect of Miranda on its rule regarding tacit
admissions.2 7 In that case, the defendant while in the
custody of police failed to protest when his accomplice
accused him of committing murder. Because Miranda is
not retroactive, 28 the rule did not apply in that particular
case. The court said, nevertheless, that the rule in the
future was that the admission into evidence of a tacit admission so taints the proceedings that defendant is deprived of a fair trial by federal constitutional standards.
There is some question whether Miranda applies to the
facts of Baughan. The accusation was made in defendant's home by Handy. Was this within the purview of
Miranda?One writer has suggested that it is.2 9' He cites a
California case holding that a woman who confessed to
25.
26.
28.
27.

id. at 477.
Supra note 3, at 704.
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966).
Commonwealth ex. rel. Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 223 A. 2d 296
(1966).
29. Graham, What Is Custodial Interrogation?: California's Anticipatory
Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. (1966).
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police in her apartment was "in custody." '3 0 One may
recall, however, that Miranda expressly allowed field investigations without the restrictions imposed on custodial interrogations. 1 Although interrogations in the
police station apparently come within the Miranda rule,
it does not necessarily follow that all interrogations carried on in the field are non-custodial. Regardless of the
interpretation of "custodial interrogation," it seems inescapable that the privilege will be extended to any situation in which an accusation is made. To hold otherwise
would allow for the manufacture of evidence by police;
the very evil sought to be eliminated by the rule enunciated in footnote 37 of Mirandawould still exist without
a substantial basis for limiting the privilege to situations
in which the accused was in custody.
Furthermore, the logic of Escobedo v. Illinois"2 suggests that the privilege against self-incrimination would
indeed apply even where the accusation was made before
the accused was "in custody." The very nature of the
statement made to the defendant or in his presence demonstrates that the process is no longer investigatory but
is now accusatory.
PATMrcX MCSWEENEY

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: Medical payments coverare construed as a separatecontract
May an injured person recover medical expenses from
the tortfeasor's insurance carrier under the medical pay30. People v. Furber,43 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1965); Comment, 53 CAL. L. Rnv.
337, 359 (1965); see also People v. Wilson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1965)
(detention on the street) ; Analogies from federal cases suggest the same
result: Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 103 (1959); Kelley v.
United States, 298 F. 2d 310 (D. C. Cir. 1961).
31. Supra note 24, at 477.
32. 378 U. S. 478 (1964).
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ments provisions of an automobile insurance contract,
after having received full payment for the settlement of
the tort claim ?
This issue was presented to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for the first time in the case of Moorman
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.' In this case,
the plaintiff was injured while a passenger in the insured's car, which was driven by the insured's wife at
the time of the accident. The tort claim against the insured's wife was settled, and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) paid the claim pursuant to
its contract with the insured.
The plaintiff later filed a motion for judgment against
Nationwide alleging that it had breached its contract by
refusing to pay her medical expenses pursuant to "Coverage G" of the insurance contract involved, which read
in part:
Coverage G-Medical Payments
To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental services,
including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral expenses:
Division 2- to or for any other person who
sustains bodily injury, caused by accident, while
occupying
(a) the owned automobile, while being used
by the Named Insured, by any resident of the
same household or by any other person with the
permission of the Named Insured... 2
1. 207 Va. 244, 148 S.E. 2d 874 (1966).
2. Id. at 246.
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On the issue of whether the plaintiff could recover under this contract after having settled the tort claim
against the insured's wife, the Court stated the following:
There is a conflict in the decisions as to whether a person injured by reason of the operation of
an insured automobile may recover under both
the general liability clause and the medical payments clause of the insurance policy. The interpretation and effect of medical payments clauses
of such policies are not uniform. The decisions
are dependent upon the peculiarfacts of the paron the provisions of
ticular case, and especially
3
the insurancecontract.
The Court noted that Nationwide had prepared this
insurance contract and had chosen to list separate and
distinct coverages for which a separate and specific premium was charged. Nationwide had listed certain exclusions from the medical payments clause of the contract, but none are relevant under the stated facts. The
Court added that Nationwide could have made a specific
exclusion to cover such a case as this and rejected the
contention that the policy as a whole showed that Nationwide did not intend to provide more than one medical
payment to each injured party.
Nationwide 's contention was that the plaintiff had already received payment for the medical expenses in the
settlement of the tort claim, and that no intention was expressed in the policy that she should receive this amount
under both the medical payments clause and by way of
damages in the tort claim against the insured's wife. The
Court found that the contract was not ambigious and said
concerning the medical payments clause:
3. Id. at 246-247 (emphasis added).

--
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... It is an absolute and unconditional agreement
to assume and pay to an injured person "who
sustains bodily injury caused by accident while
occupying" the insured's automobile, medical
expenses not exceeding $1,000.00. Consequently,
the coverages are separate and distinct, and a
specific claim can arise under each coverage.
The plaintiff was allowed to recover from Nationwide
for breach of contract since the plaintiff was held to be a
third party beneficiary to the contract. The Court followed the rule of Severson v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company.' That case held that the medical payments provision of the policy before the court was a
separate and distinct contract on facts similar to those in
Moorman.
Therefore, it appears that the answer to the original
question is that the injured party may recover from the
tortfeasor's insurance company under the medical payments clause, if that clause is found to be a separate and
distinct contract to which the injured party is a third
party beneficiary. The next problem is to determine what
causes a given provision to be a separate and distinct contract within an automobile insurance policy. Surely, this
will be the subject of future litigation in Virginia, but
Moorman indicates that one of the considerations is
whether or not the policy lists separate coverages with a
specific premium for each coverage. Rather than debate
the wisdom of following Severson, let us consider the impact that Moorman will have on Virginia practice.
In addition to possible litigation about whether a given
policy contains a separate contract concerning medical
payments, the attorneys who represent plaintiffs will find
4. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
5. 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W. 2d 872, 42 A.L.R. 2d 976 (1953).
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themselves examining the insurance policies of the defendants in automobile collision cases. The purpose of
such examination will be to determine whether or not the
plaintiff has a cause of action based on the policy as well
as the tort action against the tortfeasor. This will be a
consideration even in cases in which the tort claim has
been settled or disposed of in the court, unless the statute
of limitations on contract actions has already run. Moorman states that liability under a separate medical payments clause does not depend on the negligence of the
insured, but rather is a contract and this is a separate
undertaking by the insurance company.
Another likely result of this case is that the insurance
companies will begin to draft their policies so that the
various coverages will not be held to be separate and distinct contracts. To this writer, it seems somewhat unfair
that an injured person be allowed to recover the same
medical expenses twice. However, Moormnan suggested an
easy way to correct the results from an insurance standpoint. The insurance companies may specificially provide
that no payments be allowed under the medical payments
clause of its policy if the actual medical expenses of the
injured party have been recovered from the insured. Possibly such a clause should disallow payment if the injured
party recovers his expenses in any manner whatever.
Clauses to this effect should appear in any new policy issued in Virginia. For those cases arising under old policies, perhaps a carefully worded release would suffice to
eliminate the possibility of a double payment by the insurance companies.
WnazAm 0. Tux, JP.
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INSURANCE: Insurer's liability for a judgment in excess of the policy limits upon its refusal to settle the case
Whether an insurer is liable for an amount in excess
of the policy limits where it had an opportunity to settle
within the limits but refused to do so has been the subject
of increasing litigation in the last twenty years. However,
the problem was not considered in Virginia until 1966.
The earlier cases on this question tend to disregard any
obligation of the insurer to the insured and hold that
where the right to settle is reserved by the insurer, which
is normally the case, the company has no duty to settle
the case.' At the other extreme there would be an absolute
duty on the insurer to settle within the policy limits, if
possible, but the courts have not gone this far. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia confronted the issue
in Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Price,' and placed this
jurisdiction in accord with a majority of the courts.
In Aetna the plaintiff in the lower court had a medical
malpractice liability policy, which had the usual provisions retaining control of investigation and defense by
the named insurer. Control over settlements was also retained by the insurer (the normal situation) unless the insured wished to possibly subject himself to financial responsibility. In a prior action for malpractice there was
a judgment rendered against the doctor substantially in
excess of the policy limits, and it is significant that in this
prior action the insurer had an opportunity to settle within the limits and refused to do so, giving rise to the case
under consideration. In the lower court the doctor recovered a judgment for the excess, and on appeal the
Virginia Court considered for the first time whether an
insurer may be held liable for a judgment in excess of the
1. C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90
At. 653, 654 (1914).
2. 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E. 2d 220 (1966).
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policy limits where the insurer had the opportunity to
settle within the policy limits but refused to do so. The
Court recognized the possible conflict of interest present.
For example, if the proposed settlement is close to the
policy limits, the insurer has little to lose in litigating the
case since it would only be liable to the policy limits anyway, while the insured may lose much in litigation because he would have to pay that part of the judgment in
excess of the limits out of personal funds. The Court said
that since the defense is in the insurer's control, "a relationship of confidence and trust is created in the insurer and the insured." This being true, the Court followed the vast majority of jurisdictions in establishing a
duty owed to the insured by the insurer.
The Court had to further consider what duty the insurer must fulfill before it will be protected from liability
for the excess. The Court could have adopted one of a
number of standards including an absolute duty to protect the insured, a duty to use good faith, a duty to exercise due care, or a duty to use good faith with the burden
of proof on the insurer.'
The vast majority of jurisdictions require the insurer to exercise either good faith or
due care. Virginia adopted the more popular standard of
good faith.
The Virginia Court pronounced that the insurer must
exercise good faith, but it should be recognized that there
is no substantial agreement on what constitutes good
faith as is evident from the following examples. In St.
Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employer's Indem.
Corp., the Court, in recognizing the good faith standard,
said that the insurer was to do nothing to prejudice the
insured where the insurer would receive no benefit from
such action, but if the insurer stood to benefit there was
3. Annot. 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 173 (1955).
4. 224 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W. 2d 215, 220 (1930).
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no duty other than contractual obligations. On the other
hand in American Fid. d Gas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co.,
the Court said that the insurer must give "at least equal
consideration to the interests of the insured." 5 In Aetna,
Virginia gave an intermediate definition, quoting Radio
Taxi Ser., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co.,"
*.

.

the obligation assumed by the insurer with

respect to settlement is to exercise good faith in
dealing with offers of compromise, having both
its own and the insured's interests in mind...
A decision not to settle ...

must be an honest

and intelligent one in the light of the company's
expertise in the field. Where reasonable and
probable cause appears for rejecting a settlement
offer and for defending the damage action, the
good faith of the insurer will be vindicated.'
In applying this standard the Court considered the
thoroughness of the company's investigation, the preparation and handling of the case, the diligence used in
keeping the insured informed of negotiations, and the
competency of counsel. The Court also held that the insurer's failure to accept counsel's suggestion as to settlement is not bad faith per se.8
There is authority to support a standard of due care
although the distinction between due care and good faith
is nebulous due to the varying application of each standard.9 Even though the distinction is vague, it has been
pointed out that in applying the standard of due care the
jury is called upon to determine the reasonableness of a
settlement, a decision that would challenge an experienced
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

173 F. 2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1949).
31 N.J. 299, 157 A. 2d 319, 322, 323 (1960).
Supra note 2, at 761.
Id. at 764.
Annot. 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 171 (1955).
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lawyer and a decision that a jury is not competent to
make." Considering this distinction and the nature of
juries to render substantial verdicts against insurance
companies, it would seem that the Virginia Court was
wise in adopting the majority view.
Wnzmi L. DunDLEY, JR.

CONTRACTS: A breaking away from the traditional
law of seals in Virginia
In the recent case of Humble Oil Co. v. Cox,' the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a lease
agreement under seal and signed by the lessor was not an
irrevocable offer. Cox, the owner of a service station,
signed an ordinary 10 year lease form in the presence
of a notary public, with the letters (L.S.) following his
signature. The lease was sent to lessee, Humble, for approval and execution. On the following day, before acceptance by Humble, Cox revoked execution of the lease.
After Cox's revocation, Humble accepted and executed
the lease. The case was first heard on a Motion for Declaratory Judgment by Cox. On appeal, the Court conceded that Cox, by signing the agreement, thereby made
a valid offer, but not an irrevocable one.
Corbin is authority for the view that such an offer is
irrevocable: ". .. by the common law, sealing and delivery make that promise binding and the power of acceptance as safe from any revocation as would the payment of a consideration ... The offeree is not bound by
anything: he has a binding option, an irrevocable offer." 2
10. Epps & ChappelI, Insurers Liability in Excess of Policy Limits: Some
Aspects of the Problem, 44 VA. L. Rlv. 267, 271 (1958).
(emphasis added).
1. 207 Va. 197, 148 S.E. 2d 756 (1966).
2. 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §48 (1963); ANSON, CONTRACTS §50 (2d Am. ed.).
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Williston, in referring to an option under seal, asserts:
"A court of law as well as a court of equity assumes the
irrevocability of such offers."'
The leading case of Watkins v. Robertson' was cited
and distinguished by the Court. In Watkins, A made an
offer under seal and for one dollar consideration, which B
accepted. A alleged revocation of the offer before acceptance by B and denied consideration for the option.
The Court held that the offer under seal was not revocable and when accepted became a binding contract
which a court in equity could specifically enforce. The
Court in Watkins said:
Whether the contract here is to be treated as a
contract made for valuable consideration depends, first, upon what force and effect is to be
given a contract under seal over a like contract
not under seal.... In Virginia, we have no
statute abolishing or modifying the common law
rule as to the seal upon executory contracts.'
In Watkins, the language of the instrument evidenced a
clear intent to grant an option contract. The Court in
Humble noted that Cox proposed to enter into only one
contract, a bilateral one, imposing mutual rights and
duties: "It is one thing to enforce a one-sided promise
made with the solemnity evidenced by a seal. It is quite
another thing to enforce an implied promise that was
never intended by giving to a seal an effect that was
never intended."' The purpose of the seal in Humble,
according to the Court, was to comply with Virginia law
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1441 (rev. ed. 1937).
4. 105 Va. 269, 54 S.E. 33 (1906).

3.

5. Id. at 278-279. See also 4 M.J., CONTRACTS §23 (1949).

6. Id. at 202.
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that required a demise of property for a term of more
than five years to be in the form of a deed.7
Indicating that Humble was a case of first impression
in Virginia, the Court cited Los Angeles Rams Football
Club v. Cannon' as the case most nearly on point. The
Virginia Court said that the California Court had rejected the argument that Cannon, by signing a potential bilateral contract and accepting the tender of part of the
specified consideration, had made an irrevocable offer or
option contract. This writer .submits that a close reading
of the case will reveal no such holding. The !California
Court held that on the special facts of the case Cannon
took possession of the check on condition that the contract would be later consummated. The unendorsed check
was returned to the Rams before the contract became
effective. The agreement contained no seal as a substitute
for consideration, as in Humble, and the bonus check was
held not to constitute a valid consideration for holding
the offer open for a reasonable time under these special
circumstances.
The instrument executed -by Cox in Humble was in the
nature of an indenture deed, containing promises from
both parties. Whether the first signer is bound on such a
deed is a question of intention, according to Professor
Williston:
Though one part only of an indenture is executed, the deed will nevertheless be binding if
that part is delivered; but if there was no intent
to deliver any part until all the parts were executed, there is no obligation until this condition
is fulfilled. In any event, intent to deliver is the
controlling element.9
7. V4- CODn ANN. 1950 §55-2 (RepI. VoL 1959).
B. 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
9. 1 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS 210 (3d ed. 1957).
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The rules applicable to deeds are generally applicable to
leases.'" "An ordinary lease is a partly bilateral contract.'"I
Section 105 of the Restatement of Contracts (2nd),
cited by the Virginia Tribunal as the applicable law in
Humble, speaks not of a deed or lease but in more general
terms of a "conveyance" or "document." When such a
document contains mutual promises by the parties, rather than a single promise only of the promisor, "... acceptance by the grantee or promisee is essential to create
any contractual obligation other than an option contract
binding on the grantor or promisor."'12 Both Williston
and this section of the Restatement, it will be noted, focus
primarily on the intent of the parties. The comment to
Section 105 speaks of such intent: "Moreover, it is ordinarily not contemplated that one promise shall be made
without the other. But if consideration is given or is not
required and an intention to create an option contract,
one promise may be made irrevocable, the promisee remaining free to accept or reject. See Sec. 24A."'3
On the facts in Humble, Cox did not intend the surrender of the agreement to Humble's agent to be a legal
delivery and he was not thereby bound. There was no
intent on the part of Cox to create an option contract,
an exception to the rule in Sec. 105. Thus there was no
option contract created by the signing and sealing of the
indenture by Cox.
Section 19 of the tentative draft of the Restatement,
also mentioned by the Court, states: "Except as stated
...[under special rules] . . .the formation of a contract
requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
10. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §1272 (1952).
11. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §890 (3d ed. 1962).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS §105 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965),
(emphasis added).
13. Id. §105, comment a. (emphasis added).
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mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration."
(Section 24A speaks of an "option" as an "option contract," having the same requirements for its formation
as any other contract.) Comment a of Section 19 notes an
exception: "Where contracts under seal still have their
common-law effect, neithermanifestation of assent by the
promisee nor consideration is essential." (emphasis
added). Under Section 24A (Option Contracts), Comment c, the common law rule is again recognized by the
Restatement: "The traditional common law devices for
making an offer irrevocable are the giving of consideration and the affixing of a seal." (emphasis added). See illustration 1.: "A promises B under seal.., that A will
sell 100 shares of stock in a specified corporation for
$5,000 at any time within thirty days that B selects. There
is an option contract under which B has an option." According to Section 35A: ". . . the power of acceptance
under an option contract is not terminated by rejection.., of the offeror ...."
In summary, it would appear that there was ample
common law authority to hold that the lease signed and
sealed by Cox was an irrevocable offer and, there being
no time in the instrument stated for acceptance, that the
offer would have remained open for a reasonable time.
The acceptance by Humble within 24 hours would have
been within a reasonable time and the parties would then
have had a binding contract. The text writers and the
authors of the Restatement seem to recognize this common law rule. Watkins, cited by the Court, says that
there is no statute abolishing the common law rule in
Did the Virginia Court in Humble break away from
this common law principle7 Limiting the holding to the
facts of this case, there still seems to be some departure
from the rigid tradition of the seal. This is in line with a
Virginia.
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recent legislative trend within the United States to rid
the seal of its common law effect.' "
In future litigation in Virginia, it would seem to this
writer, that unless the offeree clearly manifests his intent to be bound by an option contract, the offer under
seal will be a revocable one. This would certainly be true
if the seal could serve some other purpose, such as the
necessity of making the conveyance "a deed" for a term
of more than five years, as was true in Humble. If the
term was for less than five years, the Court could hold
that the seal was mere surplusage, noting that there was
no clear intent manifested to form an option contract as
is necessary in Sections 19, 24A, and 105 of the Restatement, as was expressed in Humble. If the case involved a
"bare" offer under seal with no reciprocal promise by
the offeree, there is Virginia authority to the effect that
this alone would make the offer irrevocable for a reasonable time.'" Whether the Court would follow this authority or follow the "spirit" of Humble and the Restatement is an open question. Finally, if the offer involved a sale of goods that would fall within the Uniform
Commercial
Code, the law regarding seals would not ap6
ply.'
Absent clear intent by the parties, because of the
weight afforded the Restatement by the Court in Humble,
this could be the case precedent needed for the repudiation of the common law seal in Virginia.
GRAYsoN M. SANDY, JR.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 189 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
15. 4 M. J., CONTRACTS §23 (1949).
16. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 8.2-203 (Added Vol. 1965).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal or R~ussian roulette
American case law, Federal and State, substantially
supports the proposition that the accused may be sentenced to a harsher punishment when he has successfully
appealed and is being retried for the same offense.' However, the stage is set for the courts to overrule this
precedent. The revisionary process was initiated in Green
v. United States,2 and was subsequently employed in
People v. Henderson,3 and in State v. Wolf' to prevent
harsher punishment on retrial. The Court in Green ruled
that the accused, after being found guilty of arson and
second degree murder on an indictment for arson and
murder, could not be convicted of first degree murder on
a retrial after a successful appeal. This decision at face
value is no departure from widely accepted principles.'
This case predicts revised judicial thinking not in its
actual conclusion but in the reasoning employed. The
court reaches its decision on two lines of argument.
1. Green was in jeopardy of being found guilty of first
degree murder on the indictment and instructions given
at his first trial. The jury by finding Green guilty of second degree murder, implicitly found him innocent of the
greater offense of first degree murder. Since Green was
tried once for first degree murder and found innocent, it
would be double jeopardy to try him again for first degree
murder.
2. An accused in a criminal trial is guaranteed due
process of law by the Constitution. To enforce this right,
1.Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); State v. Williams, 261
N.C. 172, 134 S.E. 2d 163 (1964); 21 Am. JuR. 2d Crim. Law § 167
(1965).
2. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
3. 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P. 2d 677 (1964).
4. 46 N.J. 301, 216 A. 2d 586 (1966).
5. Leigh v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 583, 66 S.E. 2d 586 (1951); Cates
v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 837, 69 S.E. 520, 61 A.L.R. 2d 1155 §6
(1910).
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he must be able to appeal a trial denying him due process.
If Green's conviction for first degree murder on the second trial is allowed, then he is being punished for a
greater crime because he pursued a successful appeal.
This conclusion is based on the fact that if he had not
appealed, he could not be convicted for the greater crime.
Allowing the greater sentence to stand after a successful
appeal would be placing an unconstitutional condition
on the claiming of a constitutional right.
The idea of double jeopardy is that the state with its
power and resources should not be allowed a second
chance to subject a man to the possibility of being convicted for the same offense.6 A man should not be terrified
and harrassed by being tried again and again for the
same offense. The protection is against being tried a second time, regardless of whether the jury found a verdict
of guilt or innocence, or even reached a verdict.7 The pure
theory of double jeopardy would protect a defendant,
who successfully appealed, from being retried even for
the same offense. This was the practice in England until
1964.' American jurisdictions have avoided this conclusion by saying that the accused waives his right against
being tried for the same offense when he appeals.' Green
decided that this waiver should not extend to a greater
degree of the same crime of which the accused was convicted in the first trial. The jury, by finding the accused
guilty of a lesser included offense, has in effect said, "We
find the accused guilty of second degree murder and innocent of murder in the first degree." Is it logical to say
6. Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 77 S.E. 2d 447 (1953); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) ; Green v. United States, 335 U.S.
184 (1957); U.S. CONST. amend. V; VA. CONST. Bill of Rights, §8.
7. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 100 A.L.R. 2d 371 (1878); 21
AM. JuR. 2d Crim. Law § 167 (1965).
8. ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 861, 912
(35th ed. 1962).
9. Supra note 6.
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that the accused by appealing an injustice leading to his
conviction for second degree murder has waived his immunity to another indictment for first degree murder?
He has been found innocent of murder. To allow a retrial for murder would be contrary to the very essence of
the protection against double jeopardy. A waiver must
be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment.10 Waiver
of the innocent verdict would not be voluntary and, at the
time of the appeal, not even contemplated. This reasoning
applies with equal force to allowing greater punishments.1 1 The jury recommends the punishment in most
states just as they give the verdict, and both decisions
are based on the finding of fact. The jury has decided that
the accused is not guilty of a crime deserving a more
serious classification or a more serious punishment. If it
is implicit in the verdict that the jury has found the accused innocent of any higher degree of crime as argued
in Green, it is also implicit that they have found him innocent of a crime deserving a higher punishment. In fact,
many jurors arrive at the punishment they wish to award
and then decide the degree of crime to suit the penalty
they believe is deserved. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Green predicted the consequence of the decision:
It is scarcely possible to distinguish a case in
which the defendant is convicted of a greater offense from one in which he is convicted of an offense that has the same name as that of which he
was previously convicted but carries a significantly different punishment. 2
10. 56 Am. JUR. Waiver §2 (1947).
11. English Courts so rule: Samuels, Criminal Appeal Act, 1964, 27

MODERN

L. Rav. 568, 572 (1964). "Upon reconviction the accused may not be
given a sentence of greater severity than that imposed at the original
trial."

12. Supra note 2, at 213.
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The Court in People v. Henderson' applies this reasoning to overrule a death sentence on a retrial when the accused had been sentenced to life imprisonment on a prior
trial for the same offense.
The opinion in Green reaffirmed the doctrine that a
person cannot be forced to waive a constitutional right
as a prerequisite to claiming other rights protected by
the Constitution." If the accused does not appeal, the
double jeopardy clause of the Virginia and Federal Constitutions will protect him from retrial for the same offense and from an increase in his sentence. 5 The opinion
in Green argues that it is an unconstitutional condition
for appeal to force the accused to waive this protection.
If there is an error in a criminal trial which violates the
constitutional rights of the accused, he must have the
right to appeal the decision so as to remedy the denial
of his constitutional right. The courts must give a person
an available and reasonable remedy to protect these constitutional rights. If the accused's remedy (the right to
appeal) is preconditioned on the waiver of his constitutionally guaranteed freedom from double jeopardy, the
remedy is not reasonable. To force the accused to take the
risk of an increased punishment upon a successful appeal
is to force the accused to take a "desperate chance."' "
This argument is valid only if the error justifying the appeal and reversal was of a constitutional nature.' If the
error in the trial court did not violate the accused's constitutional rights, then conditioning of an appeal on an
unjust condition or even denial of an appeal would not
be unconstitutional. A recent New Jersey case avoids this
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Supra note 3.
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. RPv. 1595 (1960).
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
Supra note 3.
Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the Successful
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L. J. 606 (1965).
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rebuttal by placing its decision on a procedural basis. In
State v. Wolf, the court said:
, * . since the State has granted the universal
right of appeal, standards of procedural fairness
forbid limiting the right by requiring the defendant to barter with his life for the opportunity of
exercising it. 8
The Court used its power to regulate its procedure to
prevent higher punishment on retrial. To force the accused to waive his protection from a greater punishment
is an unreasonable condition for appeal. 9
Allowing harsher punishments on retrial attaches a
great danger to applying for a criminal appeal. It places
a "grisly choice" on the accused and forecloses many
justified appeals. In Fay v. Noia, 0 the accused, Noia, was
sentenced to life imprisonment on the basis of a coerced
confession while his two companions were sentenced to
death for the same offense. It was unfair to force Noia to
make a choice between lanquishing in prison after being
denied due process in the trial court or petitioning for an
appeal which, if successful, might well lead to a death
sentence on retrial. This is forcing the accused to play
Russian roulette. Green has pointed the way for courts
to eliminate this "grisly choice" and prevent harsher
punishments on a retrial, and the decisions in California
and New Jersey indicate the probable trend of the courts.
EUGENE lK. STREET
18. Supra note 4, at 590.
19. Supra note 3, at 686.
20. 372 U.S. 391 (19631

